ven if the bicentennial of the War of 1812 has elicited little more than a collective shrug from the American people, historians have dutifully presented fresh reviews of the conflict in its various dimensions. David Skaggs' contribution to this effort is a lucid, admiring study of William Henry Harrison's military career. It is a worthy complement to recent Harrison studies by Robert Owens and Adam Jortner.
William Henry Harrison's military service spanned the most important campaigns in the long war that wrested the Ohio country from Native Americans. He began in the early 1790s as an ensign in the Legion of the United States, and ended as the brigadier-general who defeated Tecumseh and Procter at the Battle of the Thames in 1813. As one of General Anthony Wayne's aides-de-camp, Harrison imbibed lessons in the importance of patience and preparation in the prosecution of war against Indians. Over the two decades that followed, Harrison demonstrated Wayne's "shrewd prudence," paying close attention to logistics and cultivating Native allies as scouts and intelligence-gatherers. Harrison also elaborated upon Wayne's approach, most notably by making mounted riflemen a vital component of his operations.
The book's focus is squarely on fighting: Skaggs' treatment of Harrison's life prior to and outside military service, including his territorial governorship, is cursory, and the book ends as abruptly as Harrison's military career did. Nevertheless, there is still plenty to chew on. For example, Skaggs argues that the early American militia deserves more respect than it has been granted, at the time and since.
Harrison had thought hard about the militiaversus-regulars question and took a nuanced position. He imagined a volunteer force with better recruitment mechanisms and more training and resources, a plan Skaggs deems to have been three generations ahead of its time. But as a product of Wayne's Legion, Harrison recognized the necessity of robust regular forces, and declined to support ideologically-driven initiatives that undercut them. Harrison was ultimately a pragmatist, and chose the most experienced troops available, especially mounted troops, regardless of whether they were militia or regulars. In the district under his command, this meant Kentucky militia. Indeed, Harrison's preference for Kentucky militiamen over regulars from Ohio was unmistakable, and left many of the latter feeling slighted.
At the outbreak of the War of 1812, Harrison was the most trusted military commander in the West. Nevertheless, a commission as a federal major general eluded him for many months. Skaggs recounts in detail Harrison's political travails to win unambiguous command over the North West Army. Skaggs' book offers a good description of the U.S. military's organizational dysfunction from the militia muster field all the way up to the halls of Congress. The notable exception was the cooperation that blossomed between Harrison and Oliver Hazard Perry before, during, and after the Battle of Lake Erie. Their interservice coordination was a significant achievement in a military and political culture that generally rewarded its opposite.
Skaggs identifies Harrison's careful attention to logistics as crucial to his success. The great distances between the theatre of conflict and population and manufacturing centers created obvious problems. These were compounded by what Harrison described as "the imbecility and incompetence of the public Agents and the Villainy of the Contractors" (133). Quite rightly, Skaggs does not slight Harrison's efforts to ensure his forces were properly fed, equipped, and transported. Skaggs also appreciates Harrison's abandonment of care and caution when it was time to strike. Such was the case, we are told, when he attacked the forces besieging Ft. Meigs three times on May 5, 1813.
The War of 1812 bicentennial has demonstrated that interest in the war is greatest in Canada, where it is embraced for nationalistic reasons. Taking a northern perspective on this book exposes some questions that Skaggs' treatment of Harrison leaves unanswered. The British and their colonists regarded Kentuckians in particular as "white savages." Skaggs sheds no light on how Bluegrass-State fighters might have acquired such a reputation, although he does allude rather cryptically to their "audacity," "boldness," and uncommonly long knives. More problematically, Daniel P. Barr I n the heyday of the American steel industry, observers sometimes described western Pennsylvania, as Daniel Barr reminds us in A Colony Sprung from Hell, as "Hell with the lid off" (271). The fires of political and ethnic conflict that burn throughout Barr's account of the region's earlier, eighteenth-century history were more metaphorical than real, but they burned just as brightly. Indians and European settlers fought to determine who could call the upper Ohio Valley home, French and British and American soldiers fought over whose flag would fly over Pittsburgh, and Pennsylvanian and Virginian officials and land speculators maneuvered to control the district's institutions and resources. Out of this cauldron came something like a democratic polity, but not until after fifty years of bloodshed and misery. If western Pennsylvania was, as the author suggests, the archetype of the American frontier, then the frontier was a dreadful place to live.
The masters of the long political chess game for control of the upper Ohio Valley, we learn from Barr's deeply researched narrative, were speculators in Virginia and Pennsylvania, both of which claimed the region under their colonial charters. In their contest for land and wealth, men like John Murray (Earl of Dunmore), George Washington, and Samuel Wharton used imperial officials and armies as their bishops and knights, and white settlers as their pawns. In the mid-1750s Governor Robert Dinwiddie picked a fight with the French to neutralize Pennsylvania's claims and justify an (abortive) Virginian conquest of the Ohio Forks. Pennsylvania expansionists, like Benjamin Franklin, countered by backing Edward Braddock's ill-fated 1755 expedition, hoping that the imperial army would supersede both Virginia's authority and the Penn family's land monopoly. Their plans came to grief, with backcountry settlers suffering the most as French-allied Indians destroyed their settlements. Both parties of speculators returned to the chessboard after the Seven Years' War: merchant Samuel Wharton and his associates formed the Indiana Company and opened direct negotiations with Britain to outflank the Penns, while Virginia's venial governor, Lord
